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AND THE
This part of From Newton's Sleep,
published by Princeton University
Press in 1995 and in a paperback
edition in early 1997, is reprinted
by permission of the publisher.
From Newton's Sleep is a book on
the legal form of thought and its
meaning for science and religion.
It consists of some two hundred and
fifty self-contained pieces arranged
in eight sections. In its form, the
book is much like and is meant to
be much like the material with
which lawyers routinely deal. Here,
Law Quadrangle Notes excerpts a
piece that touches on a subject of
lively debate today, among
practitioners and legal scholars
both - the nature of criminal law
and in particular its application to
economic organizations. This
excerpt, "Corporate Crime," is
from Section VII of the book, "The
Expression of Responsibility: On the
Organizational in Legal Thought. "
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The application of the criminal law to
business corporations has one overriding
function. It counters, as can nothing else,
the temptation to define the purpose of the
corporate entity as the maximization of
money profit.
Purpose pervades all aspects of the legal
analysis of entities. It governs legal
decisions on the capacities of individuals,
whether when they act they act for the
entity It governs individuals' decisions
whether to act when acting for the entity
As a purpose, profit maximization
externalizes all alue and translates all
decision into calculation of advantage,
introducing the implacable into an already
competitive world and rendering law itself,
law that conceives the entity and continues
to make it conceivable, an object not just
of some manipulation but total
manipulation.
Always in the air of thought, a playful
postulate of political, economic, and
biological theory alike, profit maximization
is only of real moment in law in analysis of
business corporations, which are not,
analytically or as a matter of fact,
themselves agents of decision-making
individuals. The temptation to profit
maximization is handled routinely in the
human breast; it appears so rarely in pure
form in individuals that its appearance is
marked as a sign of disintegration and
insanity The cycle of life and the looming
of death are alone usually sufficient to
dissolve it. But it can be abstracted out and
given to a corporate entity, and the life of

the corporate entity can be insulated from
the natural cycle of the life of an
individual. Thus entry of criminal law; and
of a criminal law, moreover, unstained by
the bloody rope or the twisted flesh of
the prison.
Criminal law is the internalization of
value. There is no crime in any set of facts ,
no matter how much hurt there is in
them, unless there is a criminal state of
mind. Causing death is common, murder
is not; what distinguishes death from
murder is mind. The criminal state of
mind, raised as a possibility by the
applicability of the criminal law, is
precisely the externalization of value
defined and protected by the criminal law,
calculation as to value, manipulation of it,
coldness toward it - precisely the
state of mind contemplated for the
profit-maximizing decision maker.
Prescription drug safety or worker
safety are not achieved by simple
prohibitions but by ingenious devices and
institutional design. The criminal penalties
that appear in connection with
prescription drugs or worker safety ha e
another function, which is to speak to the
agent of the entity who is asking, "V hat is
my duty, how am I to think about a tions
I may take on behalf of the entity?" and t
speak to the lawyer for the entity, advising
agents of the entity in the large and in the
particular. What is spoken and said is that
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for the business corporation and agents
thereof, as for individuals in other
ituations in social life , substanti e alues
are ultimatel to figure in decision as such
and in and for themselves, and are not,
ultimately, matters of indifference to be left
entirely to the concern of others.
That this needs particularly to be
declared in corporate law gives reason for
applying the criminal law more broadly to
corporations than to individuals. And the
reasons for real hesitation in invoking the
criminal law - the awful pain of its
penalties against the body, the petty
tyranny of its application to the weak and
poor, the depressi e effect of its threats in
the psychology of everyday life, which is
often named an interference with liberty or
with the sense of freedom - have not the
same force when the potential defendant is
a corporate entity The vagueness endemic
to the criminal law in the specification of
what is or is not to be done becomes less a
defect, more a protection of its efficacy
against a calculating mentality, including
that of the litigating lawyer.
Ne t to this, this declarative and
structuring function, the penalties and
sanctions criminal law brings to bear are of
secondary importance. Criminal law is
internal to corporate law, part of the
defining and enabling that corporate law
and lawyers are engaged in - the
instituting of the modem economy, its very
peopling. Criminal law does not swoop in
from the outside to affect what has already
been set in motion. Certainly there is
deterrence in some sanctions; but in the
absence of pain, and with fines set as for
individuals, or set with attention to their
effect on individuals who are dependent
on the corporation, the consequences of
criminal conviction have historically been
scoffed at and bundled into cost-benefit
formulas . Recent developments, attaching
civil liability to criminal conviction and
multiplying civil damages by some
punitive factor, introducing supervisi?n (as
in probation or other semi-incarceranve
measures for individuals) , and, above all,
conditioning corporate continuation in
licensed activities on "fitness" and
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" haracter ' (to which criminal conviction
has always been thought to speak where
individuals are involved), have made the
actual outcomes of actual criminal
prosecutions factors to be reckoned with
by corporate decision makers. And the
criminal law can work, in this sense.
Decisions about its scope, appropriateness,
and application are not troubled by any
real fear of its impotence where corporations
are involved.
But each development in the
effectiveness of the sanctions that are
directed at corporate entities meets the
web of dependencies that surround the
corporate entity and with which the entity
itself may be identified. These filaments of
connection are usually of such extent that
they cannot be ignored, as the family of
the individual convict is ignored; and
increasing sensitivity to systemic effects
generally, economic or ecological, has
made the unintended and undesirable side
effects of corporate sanctions factors to be
reckoned with by public decision makers.
It is thus in another sense that the criminal
law works, where corporations are
involved: before sanctions, addressing the
very nature of decision making on behalf
of corporations, speaking to what factors
are to be taken into account and with what
weight and what factors are not to be
taken into account, what good faith
consists of, what is authorized and what is
not, and touching moreover all those
further organizational and institutional
decisions that determine whether a
substantive determination will be
implemented - what is to be taken to
another level in decision-making structures,
or what is cause for dissociation, or what is
disclosable and what not, or what is
defensible in preventive, protective, and
self-protective activity
Analytically there are other ways to
address these questions, and they are
addressed at other places in corporate law.
If the interests of those holding securities
entitling them to participate in some way
in the equity left on liquidation (at the end
of the corporations activities) are to be
focused upon with special prominence in
corporate decision making during
corporate life, then there can be
exploration in legal argument of what

those interests are and how, when they
conflict, they are to be weighed or
sought. If the uni erse of such interests is
not the sole focus, there can be
exploration of what other groups, from
employees to customers, ar to be
admitted into the category of those
whos claims are not costs to be
minimized, and exploration of how their
interests and claims are to be defined .
Analytically these interests, groups, or
claims are often surrogates for values
protected by the criminal law, and might
enter the thinking of corporate agents
with much the same life and sense of
right. But such democratic or
communitarian capitalism is yet inchoate
and may remain so for as many centuries
as the problems of organizational law
have so far persisted.
From the earliest time corporations
have arguably been subject to the
criminal law; certainly through this
century they have . In the broadest frame
of reference, what is irrational and a
stumbling block to those who are sure
they know what the corporate entity is,
may, for the empirical, be critical
evidence of the place of entity in the
mind and, indeed, the nature of the
person created by each individual.
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